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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LAWRENCE 0. BUTTERFIELD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
9413

vs.

DONALD G. CHANEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plamtiff-respondent positively rejects the bulk of the
statement of tacts as given by defendant-appellant as being
conclusions rather than statement of facts. Therefore, the plaintiff-:espondent is constrained to restate the facts more completely.

In paragraph l on page 1 of defendant-appellant's brief,
the defendant-appellant uses the words "extended the contract,"
which is a pure conclusion and not based on any facts. The

1

original contract was in writing, was entered into A
ugust 10
1959, and reads as follows:
·
"I hereby contract for the construction of a ·
landscaping at 3270 Delmar Drive Salt LakpaCtio and
'
e oun~·
Utah, and the work to be done and the price to b .
e paid
is as follows:
"l. To. construct a retaining wall 8' by 8' by 16 of
cement cinder blocks 4 blocks high and 85 feet Ion
and to pay for the same $150.00.
g

"2. To construct approximately 800 square foot pat
of 4 inch standard concrete construction and to pay f~~
the same $238.00.
"3. To plant a lawn on the front, back, and sides of
the property. Said planning (sic) to consist of 4 inches
of top soil and multch (sic). The grass to be straight
Kentucky Blue Grass with 10% White Dutch Clover
and to pay for the same $505.00.
"The total cost of $893.00 to be paid upon the com·
pletion of the work or on completion of the work and
before August 25, 1959. If the work is completed in 1
good workmanship manner and 1s not paid for b1
August 25, 1959, I agree to pay reasonable attorneys
fees and costs.
"Dated this 10 day of August, 1959.
(signed) Donald G. Chane)·
Exhibit p.1
Concerning the second agreement, which was oral, the
defendant-appellant testified as follows:
"A Well I talked to Mr. Butterfield the same dar
the redwood ' fence man was there, but I don 't thmk
he gave me the figure until the following day.
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"Q When he gave you the figure on the following
day of $1,000.00, you agreed then to give him an oral
contract to construct the block fence and the redwood
fence for $1,000.00?
"A \X-' e agreed that he was to do the job for
$L000.00.
"Q And that was some time after the execution of
the written agreement?
"A

Yes." (R. 121)

Cuncernmg the date the oral agreement was entered into, the
Record at 128 reads as follows:
"The Court: That is about as close as we can get,
Mr. King. The 13th or thereabouts is what the Court
would believe it to be, from his testimony-the 13th
of August or thereabouts."
The plaintiff-respondent, however, testified on crossexammat10n that this conversation took place August 20th (R.
69, line 14). Further, in relation to the oral contract of August
l)th or 20th, defendant-appellant testified as follows:

· Q Now, you do recall when your deposition was

taken. do you not?
"A

Yes.

·'Q Do you recall this question being asked you:
'So that the $1,000.00 that was paid took care of the
contract in dispute, is that right? Not the original
contract?'
"Mr. Cardall: What page are you on?
"Q (By Mr. King) Page 10. And the answer: 'That
is correct. The $1,000.00 was for the wall.' Now, at the
time of that conversation-this is line 28: 'A That
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is correct. The $1,000.00 was for the wall' So
·
testified, did you not?
"A

yo11

That I said that the -

"Q That the $1,000.00 was for the wall?
"A

Well, ahead of that I said I gave him the

$1,000.00 because the wall had been built and I f ,
1
that he had earned the $1,000.00." (R. 130)
el

In regard to the third contract, the defendant-appellant
testified as follows:
"A Well, we discussed the fact that the bast was
poured too high to the surface and it would be impossible to make any planting along the wall. And one
of the things that we talked about was the possibilin'
of building a planter wall higher than the footmgs and
putting dirt on top so that we could plant there.

"Q And no design or no plan of anything was dis-

cussed?

"A That was 0en the footings were first poured,
and we discussed it at that time-just the fact that
something would have to be done.

'' Q And at no time did you ever authorize or tell

him to put in the planters?

"A We discussed it, the possibility for correct~1g
an error; that was all.

"Q And then he just went ahead and did it?
"A Yes.

"Q Now, do you recall-Coun~el, if you want-~o

refer to the transcript, I am readmg from page 1
line 16: 'Q Now, did you agree to pay him anyth~g
for putting the planter, a planter aroun d ·t 'A. No·
We said we'd take care of it when it was over with, but
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something had to be done on that. There was never
a price agreed upon. I came back one day, and it had
been done.'
.. A

That is right, yes.

"Q Now, you had discussed in detail how it was
to be done, had you not?
No; we didn't discuss it. We discussed that
something had to be done in the way of the planter and
gettmg top soil on the top of it so that we could plant
around 1t.
·A

"Q

Now, was there anything discussed about price?

"A

No .

.. Q You didn't agree upon a price and didn't discuss price?

No, we didn't discuss the price. We agreed that
something "A

· Q What did you mean when you answered that
'\v'e'd take care of it when it was over with.'
"A

Getting the top soil in.

'Q No; I am asking you about what was to be paid

for it.
"A

That \Yas not my understanding of it.

"Q I asked you about it and you said 'We said we'd
take care of it when it was over with, but something
had to be done on that.'
"A

That is right, yes.

"Q But there was no discussion or no authorization
for him to do this work?
"A

No.

"Q

And he went ahead on his own and did it with-
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out any discussion with you as to how it was t b
0
done--how high, or anything else?
e

"A

That is right, yes." (R. 140 and 141)

In view of the above testimony, the court found (Finding
No. 5):

"The court further finds that defendant received a
benefit from the planter boxes and to avoid uniu
enrichment plaintiff should be awarded payment of sa~t
based on quantum meruit, and the court further find:
~here were one hundred and seventy-five blocks placed ·
m the planter and defendant should pay for said blocks
the wholesale price of seventeen cents each for a tota. ·
of $29.75; the court further finds that top soil sells for
$12.50 per load, but that plaintiff agreed to furnish the
top soil for the planters for $10.00 per load, and plain
tiff furnished two loads of top soil for a total of $20.00: ,
it required the time of two men for six hours to con '
struct the planters, at a wage of $2.50 per hour, for a
total of $30.00; and the court finds that plaintiff shouli
be awarded in quantum meruit the sum of $79.75 iw
the planters." (R. 31)

1

The court made a finding (No. 2) as follows:
"Under the written understanding, plaintiff was tc
prepare the ground and plant a lawn, and the court
finds that plaintiff planted the lawn in a good, wori
manlike manner, and that the lawn failed to mature
and was blown away because of defendant's failJJtf
and neglecting to keep the new lawn watered and wer
and the court finds that plaintiff constructed, under 01~
written understanding, a retaining wall which w~
satisfactory; the plaintiff also did cement work and con
structed a patio to the plans and specifications provideJ
by defendant; that part of the cement in the patio 11
cracking and no evidence was received by the court a•
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to the damages which defendant would suffer by reason
of defective surfacing of the patio, but plaintiff and
cltf endant stipulated at the pretrial that a reasonable
amount to allow defendant would be the sum of $50.00;
and the court, therefore, finds that plaintiff is entitled
tu a judgment for the sum of $893.00 as prayed for in
bis complaint, le~s the $50.00 for the defective surfacing, or $843.00 on the written agreement." (R.
30-31)
The above finding was based upon the testimony of a witness
for the defendant-appellant, Willard Erickson, a Landscape
;,rchitect for Western Garden Center (R. 169, line 29).
In relation

to

the occupation of the plaintiff-respondent

and as to what he respresented himself to be, the defendantappellant testified as follows:

"Q
field?

Now, how did you come to choose Mr. Butter-

"A Through the yellow pages of the telephone
directory.

', Q

What was he listed under?

.. A

I think it is 1. 0. Butterfield Landscaping."

(R. 91)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDING THAT THE \V"RITTEN CONTRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE.

7

POINT II.
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF CAME UNDER THl
EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN 58-23-2(2) (6), UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY SES
SION LAWS 1957, CHAPTER 115, PARAGRAPH 2
AND SESSION LAWS 1961, CHAPTER 137, PARA:
GRAPH 2, AS FOUND IN THE 1961 POCKET
SUPPLEMENT TO VOLUME 6, U.C.A. 1953.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

NOT

ALLOWING

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE TENDER OF PLAINTIFF OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD
HAVE FURTHER EXPLAINED AND STRENGTHENED
THE POSITION OF PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FIND
ING THAT THE WRITTEN CONTRACT WAS EN '
FORCEABLE.
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POINT II.
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF CAME UNDER THE
EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN 58-23-2(2) (6), UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED BY SESSION LAWS 1957, CHAPTER 115, PARAGRAPH 2,
AND SESSION LAWS 1961, CHAPTER 137, PARAGRAPH 2, AS FOUND IN THE 1961 POCKET
SUPPLEMENT TO VOLUME 6, U.C.A. 1953.
Points I and II are so interrelated that they wil be argued
together.
As clearly shown by the evidence, the court was not in
error in finding that the written contract was enforceable. The
contract contained three separate jobs. Paragraph 3 provided for
the planting of the lawn at a cost of $505.00. This clearly
comes within the exemption of 58-23-2(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Session Laws 1957, Chapter 115,
paragraph 2, and Session Laws 1961, Chapter 137, paragraph 2,
as found in the 1961 Pocket Supplement to Vol. 6, U.C.A.
1953:
"Any construction or operation incidental to the
construction and repair . . . to farming, dairying, agriculture, viticulture, horticulture ... "
Paragraph 1 provided for the construction of a retaining
'::all for $150.00, and paragraph 2 of the contract provided for
tl1e construction of a patio at $238.00. The total contract price
for all three items was $893.00. Items 1 and 2 come clearly
under the definition of work for which a contractor must have
a license, and were it not for the exemption provided in para-
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graph 6 of 58-23-2 ( 6), Utah Code Annotated -,
19)) Q\
.
amen d ed , supra, th is contract would not be enf
b '
orcea le Th
exemption is as follows:
· •c

"Any work or operation on one uncle t k
.
b
[ a Jno i''
proiect y contract or contracts performed d . b
. d.
1 b
![(([[\ ,,,
111 uect y y one contractor, the a0rrrel'"ate cont.
· '
.
.
bbb
f or which, for labor, matenals and all other ~~
, ·
1ess than one thousand dollars, such work or op Jems· ',
.
.
.
. erat1on
bemg considered as of a casual, m1I1or or mcons 1
·
1
,
,
egutn
t1a nature.
There cannot be any question that this written agreement
the first contract, came within the exemption, even ivitho~·
applying exemption (2) on the law. The total being $893.uu
it did not exceed the exemption in ( 6).
Now on the question of the second oral agreement f.ir
$1,000.00, the record shows that at about the time the prl'JtU
which was contained in the written agreement was being COIT
pleted, a contractor came up to bid on a chain link fence. Cp t
that time, defendant-appellant had planned on having a l1r.
fence. The bid for this type of fence was too h1;h. and [:1
defendant-appellant then asked plaintiff-respondent to Die
on a cement block fence and a redwood fence with gates. Plarn
tiff-respondent gave him a bid of $1,000.00. The trial cour:
considered this oral agreement a new and separate pro1ect and
one not contemplated at the time the written agreement 11a
entered into (see argument under Point IV).
0

The facts and evidence show that even defendant-appellant
considered this a different project; and as the block fence was
satisfactorily completed, he paid for that work. This oral agree
ment was fully performed and fully paid for. No issues wert
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ioine<l concerning this contract and it was never properly part
of the litigation.
Defendant-appellant did not even consider the oral agreement as involved in this litigation until after his disposition
,.vas raken and they were apparently trying to find some legal
basis for not paying a legitimate debt. They discussed that
plaintiff-respondent was a landscaper and not a contractor.
Building a cinder block fence constituted the work of a conrrJctor. Hence, if the amount exceeded $1,000.00 a license
1vould be required. This theory in defense will not work unless
they can bring in the block fence and lump all the projects
cogether for a total amount in excess of $1,000.00. When the
original contract was entered into, it contained all the things
thrn planned by defendant-appellant and constituted one plan
and one project. When defendant-appellant learned that a link
fenc~ woulei cost more than he was prepared to pay, and having
seen the good work plaintiff-respondent had done on the
rttaining wall, he asked for a bid on the block fence and
redwood fence. The price being agreeable, they entered into
the oral agreement. This was a completely new project not
originally contemplated. This project was completed satisfactorily and was paid for and defendant-appellant should not
now be permitted to slip it into the litigation for the sole purpose of avoiding payment of a legitimate debt.
Had defendant-appellant properly watered the lawn and it
had matured, there perhaps would not have been any litigation.
Through the neglect of defendant-appellant (as shown by
the record and findings of the trial court), he tries to blame
his neglect on plaintiff-respondent and so refuses to pay and
this litigation is the result.
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Defendant-appellant states in his brief on page / "T

\),

he

work agreed upon by the parties hereto was for the g '
ener;,]
landscaping and improvement of appellant's grounds." If thii
statement is true and it was all general landscaping th
, en it
would come under exemption ( 2) set out above, and woutd
not constitute a defense.
Further, on page 6 of defendant-appellant's brief. '\vhi\.:
still on the premises with equipment and men and proceedin,
as agreed, was extended modifications which related to th;
contract." By no stretch of the imagination was the writt:n
agreement modified. The plaintiff-respondent performed the
written agreement exactly as provided therein with no changes
of any kind, and nothing which he did thereafter in any manne:
related to the original contract. On page 7 of defendant
appellant's brief, he states, "the Court had difficulty

1n

holdinF

that this was all more than one project." (R. 228) A careful
reading of the record will show this was a misunderstanding.

All the court was saying was that the written agreement was
one project, not that all of the work done on the property w;s
one project.
On the question of the word "project" as used bv

tiit

statute, I was only able to find two cases, both from Montana

State ex rel. Turner v. Patch et al., 210 Pac. 748 (1922). at
page 748:
"The words ·single purpose,' as used in Const art
13, paragraph 5, limiting to $10,000 the liability tn
currable by a county for a single purpose, means, accord·
ing to approved usage, one object, project, or propasi
tion · a unit isolated from all others made up of ek
men,ts which constitute an entity; something completetr
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.

itself, but separate and apart from other objects; 'single'
meaning one only, being a unit; alone; detached; one
which 1s abstracted from others; 'purpose' being that
which one sets before him to accomplish; an end,
mtent10n, or aim, object, plan, proposition, project."
On page 750:

·'We do not mean to mtlmate that comm1ss1oners
may. by making arbitrary or artificial divisions of work
which manifestly constitutes but one project, and by
issuing separate warrants to separate contractors for
separate units thus created, evade the prohibition of the
Constitution, but we do say that in no proper sense
of the terms can it be held that, as applied to this roadwork a culvert at Mondak, a cut at Froid, a fill at
Culbertson, the removal of an obstruction at Poplar,
the repair of a defect at Wolf Point, and the leveling
of the surface at Bainville constitute one project, or
that warrants severally issued for these separate pieces
of work represent an indebtedness or liability for a
single purpose, even though these points are all connected by the public roads of the county."
In the State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of County Commis-

sioners of Yellowstone County et al., 109 P.2d 1106 ( 1941),
on page 1106:

"An emergency budget of $15,000 for general relief
purposes in county where 931 persons were dependent
upon general relief was not an indebtedness or liability
for any 'single purpose' within legislative and constitutional provisions that no county shall incur any indebtedness or liability for any single purpose to an
amount exceeding $10,000 without the approval of a
majority of the electors thereof, since whether relief
shall be extended to any particular person depends upon
facts relating to him alone and not to other persons
seeking relief."
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

NOT

ALLOWING

The contract provided:

"If the work is completed in a good workmansh
manner and is not paid for by August 25, 1959, I agr~~
to pay reasonable attorney's fee and costs." (R. 2)
The pretrial order provided:
"The defendant denies liability, but in the event the
Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to attornevs
fees from the defendant, 25% of any amount recover~d
by the plaintiff, it is admitted by the defendant, would
be reasonable." (R. 28)
The purpose of providing for attorney's fees and costs is
to provide relief where it is necessary to bring an action to
enforce payment. The court awarded judgment for $843.00 oo
the written contract and under the pretrial agreement plaintifirespondent should be awarded judgment for attorney's fees io
the amount of $210.00. No attorney's fees should be allowed
on the quantum meruit. Clearly, the intent of the parties was
that an attorney's fee and costs would be paid if suit were
necessary.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE TENDER OF PLAINTIFF OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD
HAVE FURTHER EXPLAINED AND STRENGTHENED
THE POSITION OF PLAINTIFF.
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Defendant-appellant states in his brief, at page 7:
·'The Respondent accepted the construction of the
cement block wall a short time after he began work on
the lawn. He stopped work on the lawn and proceeded
with the fence. After completing the fence, he returned
to finish the lawn. App~l,lant respectively submits that
this clearly shows the interrelationship of the work."
This statement in defendant-appellant's brief strongly points
up the importance of the tender which plaintiff-respondent
made as shown in the record:
"Mr. King: It is our position, Your Honor, that this
occurred at-this conversation in regards to the wall
fence occurred considerably later than what Mr. Chaney
testifies to and that the work was materially progressing and had progressed and that it was necessary for
Butterfield to haul in clay and prepare the ground here
in order to set the footings on it; that had he known
that this fence was to be constructed, part of that three
loads of material that they had to haul away, of course
not the rocks-part of that three loads of material that
they had to haul away, he could have taken and used
down here as a base for this retaining wall and at a
saving in expense and his testimony will be that he had
to haul in clay and had to haul in material to form a
base to set that cement on for that retaining wall.
"The Court: Well, he knew or should have known
that when he signed this." (R. 203)
··Mr. King: My whole purpose in bringing this in
was merely to show that had this been-this whole
thing been one project, that the project could have been
handled and would have been handled in a more economical manner and my purpose in introducing it is
to show that it is not the entire thing-the entire thing
is not a joint project.
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"The Court:
·
h· h
versat10n w K
fence occurred
the signing of
into it.

If they contended that th

1

e oral c
. rought about the building of the on
rn advance of or si·mult
block
aneous 1y ··
this, then I would permit
Witn
you to gn
b

"Mr. Cardall: But we do not, Your Honor." (R.
205-206)
And further:
"The Court: Yes, and I must sustain the objection
You may now call Mr. Butterfield back.
· '

"Mr. King: Mr. Reporter, you took the argument and .
so we make the statements which I made in my argu '
ment as a tender and obiect to the ruling of the Court
"The Court: And as a tender, the tender is refused.

(R. 206)

The purpose of the tender is set out above in the tender
itself, and so further additional statements should not be
necessary. Even without this evidence, the court correctly found
that each of the transactions was a separate project and a
separate undertaking, and arrived at the correct conclusion
without the necessity of admitting the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
KARL V. KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
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